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Family Support
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This Article offers a new perspective on the relationship between family
and federalism by analyzing why the government-whether state or federal-
recognizes family at all. The Article examines the current balance between state
and federal authority over family by reviewing the Supreme Court's recent
decisions in Astrue v. Capato, upholding the Social Security Administration's
deference to states' intestacy laws when distributing benefits to posthumously
conceived children, and United States v. Windsor, in which the Court struck
down a provision of the federal Defense of Marriage Act. Although each decision
affirmed the states'primary role in defining family status, developments before
and after Capato and Windsor reveal that federal agencies and courts are
increasingly promulgating federal definitions of family. In particular, federal
courts have rejected many states' definitions of marriage post-Windsor. This
Article argues that these developments are not motivated by a rejection of
federalism or the diversity and pluralism that is thought to flow therefrom.
Instead, federalism remains an important value so long as it does not displace
the underlying reason for legal recognition of family: the encouragement of
private family support.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The individual states have long played a primary role in defining
the legal family in the United States, with states often determining who
does and does not enjoy the legal status of spouse, parent, and child.
Two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, Astrue v. Capatol and United
States v. Windsor,2 acknowledged and affirmed the diverse definitions
of family that flow from this federalist approach. Yet these cases do not
solidify the states' place in defining family for purposes of marriage,
parentage, divorce, and death. Instead, they foreshadow an
increasingly federal conception of family status-a conception that
values private family support over diversity and pluralism.
This Article describes this federalization of family status and
then analyzes the ways it furthers the underlying reason for legal
family recognition: private family support. Federal agencies and courts
have increasingly usurped the states' authority to define family. These
decisions are not rooted in rejections of state sovereignty, however, or
the diversity and pluralism that flow therefrom. Instead, federalism
remains an important value so long as it addresses family dependencies
and facilitates the private support of those dependencies.
Part II examines the role of federalism in the Supreme Court's
Capato and Windsor decisions. Although many commentators have
analyzed the deployment of federalism in Windsor, in which the Court
struck down a provision of the Defense of Marriage Act, this Article
offers the first robust comparison of Windsor and Capato, in which the
Court affirmed the Social Security Administration's deference to states'
intestacy laws when distributing survivors benefits to children.
Although the Court decided neither case on federalism grounds, the
Court in both cases affirmed the states' primary role in defining family.
Yet developments both before and after Capato and Windsor
reveal that federal courts and agencies do not consistently defer to
states' authority to define family. In fact, the Supreme Court and other
federal courts have increasingly imposed definitions of family upon the
1. 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
2. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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states. Part III analyzes this federalization of family. In particular, this
Article offers the most comprehensive overview to date of the ways
federal courts have rejected many states' definitions of marriage post-
Windsor.
Part IV then analyzes why federal courts and agencies may
continue to defer to states' definitions of family in some situations but
not others. The Article concludes that a hierarchy of values is at play.
Federalism and state sovereignty remain important, but they are not
as important as the legal family's private support function. Federal
agencies and courts therefore embrace federalism only when it
potentially furthers the privatization of family dependencies. By
returning to why the government-whether federal or state-
recognizes family at all, the Article offers a new perspective on the
relationship between family and federalism.
II. DEFINING FAMILY: LOOKING TO THE STATES TO DETERMINE WHO'S
IN AND OUT
The U.S. Supreme Court has long pronounced that family law
belongs to the states in our federalist system.3 Although the federal
government also has regulated various matters affecting families, at
first sporadically and then more consistently,4 the Court has affirmed
3. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (describing domestic relations as "an
area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States"); De Sylva v.
Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) ("The scope of a federal right is ... a federal question, but
that does not mean that its content is not to be determined by state, rather than federal law. This
is especially true where a statute deals with a familial relationship . . . .") (citation omitted);
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 575 (1906) ("[T]he states, at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, possessed full power over the subject of marriage and divorce."), overruled on other
grounds by Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). For historical discussions of
how this assignment developed and then survived the demise of dual federalism, see Kristin A.
Collins, Federalism's Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and the Invention of
States' Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761, 1815-42 (2005); Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and
Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1821-25 (1995); and Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the
Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLAL. REV. 1297, 1306-10 (1998). For discussions of the related issues
of the domestic relations exception and probate exception to federal court jurisdiction, see Naomi
R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073, 1076-94 (1994)
(domestic relations exception); Peter Nicolas, Fighting the Probate Mafia: A Dissection of the
Probate Exception to Federal Court Jurisdiction, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1520-21 (2001) (probate
exception); and James E. Pfander, The Playmate and the Probate Exception, 94 ILL. B.J. 320, 320-
21 (2006) (probate exception).
4. See MARK E. BRANDON, STATES OF UNION: FAMILY AND CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 216-26, 232-49, 265-73 (2013) (tracing how the family came to be a
subject of U.S. constitutional law beginning in the early twentieth century through the present);
Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 211-31 (1999)
(demonstrating how "family law appears throughout federal statutory and regulatory law, cast not
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the states' primary role in defining family.5 Many commentators praise
this allocation of authority, arguing that it promotes family pluralism
by honoring local choices and values.6 Others note, however, that
federalism produces "inequality by design."7 Many commentators thus
as family, but as the proper subject of enumerated federal power"); Linda D. Elrod, The
Federalization of Family Law, 36 HUM. RTS. 6, 6-9 (2009) (describing U.S. Supreme Court
involvement in family law and the "multitude of federal laws [that] now regulate and impact
families"); Courtney G. Joslin, Federalism and Family Status, 90 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2015)
(manuscript at 16), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2485595, archived at http://perma.cc/
ZAJ8-TMHL ("[T]he federal government does not and has not always deferred to state family
status determinations."); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the
Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 653-55 (2001) [hereinafter Categorical Federalism] ("[D]enominating an
issue as about family life has not precluded federal legal regimes from imposing obligations,
structuring sanctions, and creating incentives among individuals designated to be family
members."); Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal
Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1721-30, 1743-44, 1746-47 (1991) [hereinafter "Naturally"
Without Gender] (concluding that "the idea that family law belongs to the states becomes
problematic" after considering the "history of sporadic federal intervention ... coupled with the
many contemporary federal laws that affect and regulate family life").
5. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12-13 (2004) (discussing the
Court's "strong ... deference" to state law in cases involving family members and its recognition
of the domestic relations exception); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000)
(cautioning against congressional use of the commerce power in "family law and other areas of
traditional state regulation"); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565-68 (1995) (declining to
provide Congress with a "general police power of the sort retained by the States" in part because
it would extend to "subjects such as family law and direct regulation of education"); see also
Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131, 201
(2009) (proposing that federal actors continue to defer to the states "in the prescription of the
substance of core family law relationships" while federal courts "take the job (shared with state
courts) of proscribing constitutional violations and other unwarranted state intrusions on personal
autonomy"); Sylvia Law, Families and Federalism, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL Y 175, 184 (2000)
("[S]tates have primary responsibility for the regulation of families, yet the federal government
has considerable authority to intervene and often has done so.").
6. See F. H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 561, 601-02 (2001) (arguing that "local laws can build on local preferences"); Dailey,
supra note 3, at 1790 (defending "state sovereignty over family law ... because of the fundamental
role of localism in the federal design"); Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism and Child Support, 5 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 541, 558 (1998) ("Allocating a high level of discretion to local judges, subject to
oversight by state legislatures and appellate courts, permits maximum flexibility in designing
norms that are presented every day in local communities."); Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing
Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 267, 333 (2009)
(arguing that Congress should consider the "broad range of policy variation among the states"
when enacting family law so that states may implement it according to their "traditions and
circumstances"); Elizabeth G. Patterson, Unintended Consequences: Why Congress Should Tread
Lightly When Entering the Field of Family Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 399-400, 406 (2008)
(emphasizing that "nationally adopted rules will fail to capture local norms and practices"); Lynn
D. Wardle, Tyranny, Federalism and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
221, 253-54 (2005) (noting that early Americans embraced state regulation of marriage in order
to prevent tyranny by the federal government).
7. Susan Frelich Appleton, Domicile and Inequality by Design: The Case of Destination
Weddings, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1449, 1454-55; see also Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law
Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 390-92 (2007)
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argue that deference to the states primarily insulates federal agencies
and courts from the messiness of family life, thereby belittling the
importance of family relationships, devaluing women and children, and
inappropriately reinforcing the divide between the public and private
spheres.8 Critics also argue that the assignment of family law to the
states obscures the multiple ways that family is already implicated in
many substantive (and more uniform) areas of federal law, including
tax law and the law of individual liberties.9
Despite these criticisms, the Court continued to defer to states'
definitions of family in three recent cases concerning the definition of
family for purposes of federal law. In Astrue v. Capato, the Court upheld
the Social Security Administration's use of states' intestacy laws to
determine whether posthumously conceived twins qualify as "children"
for purposes of federal survivors benefits. 10 The next term, the Court
turned to the other half of the parent-child relationship, assuming that
states' definitions of "parent" applied to a contested adoption under the
federal Indian Child Welfare Act."1 Then, in United States v. Windsor,
the Court emphasized "the state power and authority over marriage as
a matter of history and tradition"12 in ruling that the provision of the
federal Defense of Marriage Act defining marriage as between one man
(acknowledging the inequality of nonuniform divorce laws); Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals:
From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1479, 1489-91, 1520 (2001)
(arguing that a uniform law requiring couples to select from among alternative forms of marriage
is the best way to account for diverse norms and values).
8. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 4, at 255-58 (arguing that "allocation of family matters to the
states reflects the same ideals that placed family in the private sphere"); Cahn, supra note 3, at
1098-1111 (arguing that the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction is in part rooted
in federal courts' reluctance to confront "the emotional and dependent side of family life-the
messy realities of divorce, children, and child abuse"); Jeffrey A Redding, Slicing the American
Pie: Federalism and Personal Law, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 941, 988-91 (2008) (noting that
feminists in the early twentieth century "viewed both 'family federalism' and state-premised
federalism as opposed to women's interests" and arguing that "things have not improved much in
the past seventy-five years"); "Naturally" Without Gender, supra note 4, at 1745-50 ("Women and
the families they sometimes inhabit are not only assumed to be outside the federal courts, they
also are assumed not to be related to the 'national issues' to which the federal judiciary is to devote
its interests.").
9. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 4, at 257 ("[T]he impossibility of extricating family law from
so many substantive areas of federal law (e.g., taxation, tort, constitutional liberties, etc.) leads to
the conclusion that family is hardly handled as a trivial matter, but rather that family's
importance is obscured when legal actors deny this inextricability."); Hasday, supra note 3, at
1370-76 (analyzing how the family law aspects of federal "laws about taxation, citizenship, social
welfare, social security, or the like" have been "systematically overlooked").
10. 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033-34 (2012).
11. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). The Court ultimately assumed,
without deciding, that the biological father at issue was a legal parent. Id. at 2560 & n.4.
12. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013).
2014] 1839
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and one woman unconstitutionally excluded same-sex marriages,
recognized under some states' marriage laws, from federal benefits.13
Although the Court did not explicitly decide these cases on
federalism grounds, each holding reaffirmed the Court's assignment of
family status to the states. Pluralistic definitions of family therefore
persist even as the federal government increasingly distributes benefits
to, and imposes burdens on, family members. As discussed in more
detail below, Capato and Windsor in particular illustrate the ways that
the Court embraces states' diverse conceptions of family even for
purposes of federal law.
A. Defining the Parent-Child Relationship
In Capato, a mother sought federal Social Security survivors
benefits for twins that she conceived using her deceased husband's
frozen sperm. 14Prior to his death, the husband had deposited his semen
in a sperm bank in anticipation of his upcoming treatment for
esophageal cancer. 15 The couple conceived a child "naturally" during the
husband's chemotherapy treatment, but the husband died before they
were able to conceive a second child.16 Thereafter, the surviving wife
underwent in vitro fertilization, giving birth to twins eighteen months
after her husband's death. 17 It was undisputed that the twins were the
biological children of the deceased husband. 18
The couple's first child was eligible for Social Security survivors
benefits after his father died.19 The mother sought similar benefits for
the twins conceived after her husband's death, but the Social Security
Administration denied her application. Invoking a definitional
provision of the federal Social Security Act,20 the Agency ruled that the
13. Id. at 2695-96.
14. 132 S. Ct. at 2025.
15. Id. at 2026.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2026-27.
19. Id. In 1939, Congress amended the Social Security Act to provide a monthly benefit for
"designated surviving family members" of deceased wage earners. Id at 2027 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(d) (2012)).
20. Under a section entitled "Determination of family status," the Act provides:
In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully or currently insured
individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall
apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal
property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at the
time such applicant files application, or, if such insured individual is dead, by the courts
of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death, or, if such insured
individual is or was not so domiciled in any State, by the courts of the District of
1840 [Vol. 67:6:1835
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twins would qualify for benefits only if the intestacy law of the
husband's domiciliary state recognized the twins as his legal children.21
Because the husband died domiciled in Florida,22 and Florida law
recognizes after-born children as heirs only if they were conceived
before a decedent's death,23 the Agency concluded that the twins were
not "children" and thus were ineligible for benefits.24 The mother
appealed the Agency's decision in federal court, and the district court
agreed with the Agency's interpretation of the Social Security Act. 25
The Third Circuit reversed, finding that "the undisputed
biological children of a deceased wage earner and his widow" qualify for
survivors benefits as a matter of federal law, without regard to state
intestacy law.26 The Third Circuit reasoned that the Social Security
Act's invocation of state intestacy law comes into play only "when a
claimant's status as a deceased wage-earner's child is in doubt."2 7
Because "all parties agree [d] that the applicants here are the biological
offspring of the Capatos," the Court found that there was no need to
apply state law.28
Columbia. Applicants who according to such law would have the same status relative
to taking intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed such.
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2012).
21. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2029.
22. Although the Social Security Administration and the district court concluded that the
decedent died domiciled in Florida, the Third Circuit initially did not reach the issue. Id. at 2026,
2027 n.2. The Supreme Court therefore emphasized that the issue of domicile could be considered
on remand. Id. at 2027 n.2. Upon remand, the Third Circuit concluded that there was sufficient
evidence for the administrative law judge to conclude that the decedent was domiciled in Florida
at his death. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 532 Fed. Appx. 251, 253 (3d Cir. 2013). The
decedent lived in Florida for three years before his death and manifested an intent to stay by
conducting business in the state and validly executing a will under Florida law. Id.
23. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.106 (West 2014). Florida law also provides that '[a] child conceived
from the eggs or sperm of a person or persons who died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm, or
preembryos to a woman's body shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent's estate unless
the child has been provided for by the decedent's will." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West 2014). It
was undisputed that the decedent in Capato validly executed a will making no provision for
children conceived after his death. 132 S. Ct. at 2026.
24. 132 S. Ct. at 2026.
25. Id.
26. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 2011). The Ninth
Circuit had previously reached a similar conclusion, Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593,
596-98 (9th Cir. 2004), but other circuit courts had sided with the Agency's deference to state
intestacy law, Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 960-64 (8th Cir. 2011); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d
49, 54-63 (4th Cir. 2011).
27. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 631 F.3d at 631.
28. Id. Earlier in the opinion, the Third Circuit used slightly different language, emphasizing
that there was no need to refer to the Act's definitional provisions when considering "the biological
child of a married couple." Id. at 630.
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A unanimous Supreme Court disagreed. Closely analyzing the
interplay of the various provisions of the Social Security Act, the Court
concluded that the Agency was reasonable in requiring applicants for
survivors benefits to meet the definition of "child" either under the
relevant state's intestacy law or under one of the three, relatively
narrow definitions of child otherwise set forth in the Act.29 Because the
twins' mother did not (and likely could not) invoke any of those
alternative criteria,30 the Court concluded that the twins could receive
survivors benefits only if they met the intestacy-based definition of
"child." In reaching its holding, the Court considered and rejected the
Third Circuit's position that there is no need to determine a child's
status "whenever the claimant is 'the biological child of a married
couple.' "31 The Court emphasized that such an interpretation relies on
words not found in the federal statute,32 iS inconsistent with dictionary
and Restatement definitions of "child," 33 inappropriately elevates the
roles of both biology and marriage in determining parentage,34 and
provides no time constraints on a qualifying child's birth.35
Moreover, the Capato Court stressed that "[r]eference to state
law to determine an applicant's status as a 'child' is anything but
anomalous."36 In fact, the Social Security Act "commonly refers to state
law on matters of family status," including by relying on the law of the
insured's domicile to define the terms "wife," "widow," "husband," and
"widower."37 Requiring most "child" applicants to meet state intestacy
definitions therefore is not unusual and "avoid[s] congressional
entanglement in the traditional state-law realm of family relations."38
The Court thus concluded its opinion by refusing to "replace [the]
reference [to state intestacy law] by creating a uniform federal rule the
statute's text scarcely supports."39
The Capato Court thereby deferred to the Agency's reliance on
state intestacy law to determine posthumously conceived children's
eligibility for federal benefits. Given the variation in states' intestacy
29. 132 S. Ct. at 2030-33.
30. Id. at 2028 n.5.
31. Id. at 2029 (quoting Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 631 F.3d at 630).
32. Id. at 2030.
33. Id. at 2029-30.
34. Id. at 2030.
35. Id. at 2032.
36. Id. at 2031.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2034.
1842 [Vol. 67:6:1835
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laws concerning posthumously conceived children, the Court's holding
means that neither the Capato twins,40 nor other posthumously
conceived children whose biological fathers were domiciled in states
with intestacy laws like Florida's,41 will receive federal survivors
benefits. Posthumously conceived children whose biological fathers
were domiciled in other states, however, may be entitled to benefits. For
example, posthumously conceived children whose biological fathers
were domiciled in states that have adopted the relevant provisions of
the Uniform Probate Code will be eligible for benefits if conceived
within three years of their biological fathers' deaths.42
Many commentators, including Lawrence Waggoner,43 have
criticized this outcome, emphasizing that neither state nor federal law
has kept up with changes in reproductive technologies.44 These
critiques implicitly assume that all posthumously conceived children
should be treated alike for purposes of federal benefits, but they do not
explain why uniformity is desirable. In fact, critics seem to assume that
a better-developed law will also be a more uniform law.45 Yet if the
40. Indeed, the Third Circuit held on remand that the Capato twins were not eligible for
survivors benefits. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 532 Fed. Appx. 251, 253 (3d Cir. 2013).
41. See, e.g., Bosco ex rel. B.B. v. Astrue, No. 10 Civ. 07544, 2013 WL 3358016, at *7-12, 15
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013) (holding, after an extensive analysis of New York intestacy law, that
posthumously conceived children are not eligible for survivors benefits), adopted in relevant part
by Bosco ex rel. B.B. v. Colvin, No. 10 Civ. 07544(LTS), 2013 WL 3357161, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. July
3, 2013); Amen v. Astrue, No. 4:10-CV-3216, 2013 WL 274923, at *2-3 (D. Neb. Jan. 24, 2013)
(holding that posthumously conceived children are not eligible for survivors benefits in light of the
Nebraska intestacy statute).
42. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) (amended 2010) (providing that a posthumously
conceived child is "treated as in gestation at the individual's death" if that child is "in utero within
36 months after the individual's death or born within 45 months after the individuals death").
43. Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Creeping Federalization of Wealth-Transfer Law, 67 VAND.
L. REV. 1635, 1659-61 (2014).
44. See, e.g., Arianne Renan Barzilay, You're on Your Own, Baby: Reflections on Capato's
Legacy, 46 IND. L. REV. 557, 575-80 (2013) (arguing that the Capato Court's analysis reinforced
patriarchal, social, and biological assumptions and missed an opportunity to challenge those
assumptions in light of new technology). Upon remand, Judge Vanaskie echoed some of these
criticisms, issuing a concurring opinion that criticized Congress for failing to amend the Social
Security Act in light of new reproductive technologies. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 532 Fed. Appx. at
254-55. Professor Waggoner similarly calls on Congress to "bring[ ] the Social Security Act's
survivors benefits provisions up to date." Waggoner, supra note 43, at 1661.
45. See, e.g., Kristine S. Knaplund, Children of Assisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 899, 935 (2012) (arguing that adoption of the Uniform Probate Code or Uniform Parentage
Act "would be a vast improvement for most states"); Waggoner, supra note 43, at 1661 ("Sometimes
state law is neither uniform nor well-enough developed-and not likely to become so in the
foreseeable future-to govern rights to federal benefits."); Louise Weinberg, A General Theory of
Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking Power, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1057, 1108-11 (2013)
("[The Capato opinion] did not explain how consulting fifty different state laws would be less
burdensome than simply following the language of the existing federal law. . . .").
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pluralism underlying federalism retains any value, then the Capato
Court appropriately deferred to states' definitions of family. And, as the
Capato Court emphasized, this general deference to states' authority is
by no means anomalous when determining who counts as family.
During its next term, the Court turned to the other half of the
parent-child relationship. Specifically, the Court considered whether a
biological father who initially waived his rights to his newborn child
was a "parent" for purposes of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act.4 6
Although a five-four majority ultimately assumed, without deciding,
that the father was a legal parent,4 7 the Court emphasized that state
law, rather than any federal common law, governs parentage and its
incidents in the absence of specific federal language to the contrary.4 8
The dissenting justices embraced a broader view of the statutory
language at issue, but they also looked to states' laws protecting
biological fathers' interests in adoption proceedings.4 9
The Supreme Court therefore continues to position the states as
the primary arbiters of parental and child status, even for purposes of
federal law. Although federal statutes may offer additions or
refinements to states' definitions,50 states generally remain the
baseline for determining whether individuals qualify as legal children
or parents. States' definitions overlap to a great extent, leading to much
consistency across the states, but family pluralism, rather than
uniformity, flourishes at the margins.
B. Defining Marriage
The states have also long defined marriage, specifying who may
enter into the status and setting the terms for exit.51 Until the passage
of the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") in 1996, the federal
government almost wholly deferred to states' determinations of who
was and was not married, even for purposes of federal law.52 DOMA
46. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013).
47. Id. at 2560 & n.4.
48. Id. at 2562 & n.7.
49. Id. at 2581-83 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
50. For another example, see the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654
(2012).
51. See sources cited supra note 3. For an overview of how states' regulation of marriage
evolved over time, see NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION
passim (2000).
52. One of the limited exceptions to this deference, continuing to this day, concerns Social
Security benefits. The federal government recognizes some marriages that are not recognized
under state law so long as the individual seeking spousal benefits "in good faith ... went through
1844 [Vol. 67:6:1835
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constituted a radical departure from that practice, promulgating
independent definitions of "marriage" and "spouse" for all federal
purposes.53 DOMA specified that "[i]n determining the meaning of any
Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the
various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the
word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."54
In United States v. Windsor, a surviving spouse challenged the
constitutionality of DOMA after she was unable to claim the federal
estate tax exemption for surviving spouses because she had been
married to another woman.55 The district court and Second Circuit
concluded that the plaintiff qualified as a surviving spouse under the
law of New York, where the couple had been domiciled at the time of
the deceased spouse's death.5 6 Yet even though her marriage had been
valid under state law, the surviving same-sex spouse was required to
a marriage ceremony with the insured that would have resulted in a valid marriage except for a
legal impediment," defined to include "only an impediment which results because a previous
marriage had not ended at the time of the ceremony or because there was a defect in the procedure
followed in connection with the intended marriage." 20 C.F.R. § 404.346 (2014). In addition, the
Social Security Administration recognizes common-law marriage "regardless of any particular
State's view on [those] relationships." United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2690 (2013) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(d)(2)). In all other instances, the Agency looks to the law of the state where the
spouse died to determine the validity of the surviving spouse's marriage. See, e.g., Weiner v.
Astrue, No. 09 Civ. 7088(SAS), 2010 WL 691938, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010). For discussion
of other exceptions in the context of immigration, see Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti,
Immigration's Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 629 passim (2014).
53. As the Second Circuit would later state, "DOMA was therefore an unprecedented
intrusion 'into an area of traditional state regulation.' " Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169,
186 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't ofHHS, 682 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2012)); see
also David B. Cruz, The Defense of Marriage Act and Uncategorical Federalism, 19 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 805, 814-27 (2011) (explaining that DOMA, while purporting to protect states that
did not want to recognize same-sex marriage, "disregards the very state definitions of marriage
supposedly safeguarded . . substituting a national marriage definition for virtually any federal
purpose").
54. 1 U.S.C. § 7. DOMA became law "as some States were beginning to consider the concept
of same-sex marriage and before any State had acted to permit it." United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. at 2682 (citation omitted). For more background, see id. at 2693 and Windsor v. United
States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
55. 133 S. Ct. at 2675.
56. Although New York did not yet issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples at the time
of the deceased spouse's death, it recognized same-sex marriages valid in other jurisdictions, and
the couple had been legally married in Toronto. See id. at 2689; Windsor, 699 F.3d at 177-78;
Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 398-99.
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pay $363,053 in federal estate taxes that a similarly situated surviving
mixed-sex spouse would not have been required to pay.57
The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in the surviving spouse s
favor, concluding that "DOMA's principal effect is to identify a subset
of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal,"5 8 thereby
violating "basic due process and equal protection principles applicable
to the Federal Government."59 Like the Capato Court, the Windsor
Court did not explicitly rely on federalism in reaching its holding.60
Instead, the Court ultimately concluded in a five-four opinion that
DOMA "was motivated by an improper animus or purpose."6 1
Even though the Windsor Court did not frame its decision in
federalist terms, the Court relied heavily on states' authority to define
marriage.62 The Court proceeded in three steps. First, the Court
emphasized states' "historic and essential authority to define the
marital relation."63 The Court explained that this authority remains
essential because it confers dignity on couples; New York's recognition
of same-sex marriage gave same-sex couples "a dignity and status of
57. 133 S. Ct. at 2684-85. Prior to the passage of DOMA, Congress had never "refused to
recognize a state-law determination of marital status" for purposes of tax law. Christopher J.
Hayes, Note, Married Filing Jointly: Federal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages Under the
Internal Revenue Code, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1593, 1602 (1996).
58. 133 S. Ct. at 2694; see also Patricia A. Cain, DOMA and the Internal Revenue Code, 84
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 481, 494 (2009) ("[T]he intent of DOMA was to reject same-sex marriages even
when a duly elected and representative state legislature might approve of such marriages.").
59. 133 S. Ct. at 2693. For a fuller discussion of the Court's due process and equal protection
analyses, see David B. Cruz, "Amorphous Federalism" and the Supreme Court's Marriage Cases,
Loy. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 29-37), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2352038, archived at http://perma.cc/F7VZ-F23Y; Nancy C. Marcus,
Deeply Rooted Principles of Equal Liberty, Not "Argle Bargle": The Inevitability of Marriage
Equality After Windsor, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 17, 25-29 (2014).
60. 133 S. Ct. at 2692 ('[I]t is unnecessary to decide whether this federal intrusion on state
power is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the federal balance."). Some
commentators argue, however, that federalism played a larger role than the Court acknowledged.
See Heather Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 YALE L.J. 1958, 1991 (2014) ("Windsor is neither
an equality opinion nor a federalism opinion. It is both."); Courtney G. Joslin, Windsor, Federalism,
and Family Equality, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 156, 159-68 (2013) (summarizing various
commentators' arguments before ultimately concluding that "it is misleading to describe Windsor
as a federalism-based opinion").
61. 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996); Dep't of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)). For more discussion of the Court's reliance on, and
development of, this constitutional anti-animus principle, see Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products:
Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 215-21.
62. 133 S. Ct. at 2692 ("The State's power in defining the marital relation is of central
relevance in this case quite apart from principles of federalism."). For a critical perspective on the
use of federalism in Windsor, see Andrew Koppelman, Why Scalia Should Have Voted to Overturn
DOMA, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 131, 138-42 (2013).
63. 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
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immense import ... enhanc[ing] the recognition, dignity, and protection
of the class in their own community."64 The Court thereby emphasized
that "marriage is more than a routine classification for purposes of
certain statutory benefits."65 Rather, marriage is a "far-reaching legal
acknowledgment of the intimate relationship between two people, a
relationship deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the community
equal with all other marriages."66
Second, the Court identified DOMA's departure from the
"history and tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage" as a
type of " 'discrimination[] of an unusual character,' " thus warranting
"'careful consideration to determine whether [it is] obnoxious to the
constitutional provision.' "67 The Court proceeded to scrutinize the
effects of "DOMA's unusual deviation from the usual tradition of
recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage."68 The Court
concluded that this departure "operates to deprive same-sex couples of
the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal recognition
of their marriages."69 In turn, the Court classified the departure from
state law as "strong evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of
disapproval" of same-sex marriages.70
Finally, the Court resisted any suggestion that DOMA was
necessary for federal uniformity, instead focusing on uniformity of
another sort. Although it recognized that "marriage laws vary in some
respects from State to State,"71 the Court emphasized that the states'
64. Id. at 2681, 2692. The Court arguably invoked a relatively weak form of dignity, however.
See Noa Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual, 37 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 243, 276-80 (2014) (criticizing Windsor for embracing a conception of dignity that
is conferred "at each state's direction," is "much narrower in scope than contemporary theories of
dignity promoted by legal and moral philosophers," and "comes with unnecessary rhetoric of
injured subjects, a rhetoric that could perpetuate an attachment o injury by homosexual couples
and other rights-seeking legal subjects"). For a critique of the Court's reliance on dignity, see
Neomi Rao, The Trouble with Dignity and Rights of Recognition, 99 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 29, 32-
36 (2013).
65. 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). Courtney Joslin refers to this
aspect of the Court's reasoning as the "unusualness trigger argument." Joslin, supra note 60, at
166. Abbe Gluck refers to it as a "resistance norm - a feature requiring special consideration when
judging Congress's intervention." Abbe Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996,
2013 (2014).
68. 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2691; see also Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem
of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 437-45 (2005) (detailing historical and
contemporary differences in age and consanguinity restrictions).
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various marriage rules "are in every event consistent within each
State."72 Accordingly, "DOMA rejects the long-established precept that
the incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all
married couples within each State, though they may vary, subject to
constitutional guarantees, from one State to the next."73 Moreover, that
rejection "ensure[s] that if any State decides to recognize same-sex
marriages, those unions will be treated as second-class marriage for
purposes of federal law."74 Therefore, "DOMA's principal effect is to
identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them
unequal."75
In this tripartite manner, the Windsor Court rejected a federal
definition of marriage and embraced states' diverse definitions of
marriage without explicitly relying on federalism. In contrast to the
criticism of Capato, many commentators have embraced this pluralistic
approach.76 Like the reactions to Capato, however, most commentators
appear to embrace pluralism as a first step toward uniform recognition
of same-sex marriage by all fifty states.77 Neil Seigel explicitly argues
that such uniformity is the Court's ultimate goal, with the Court's
federalism rhetoric "reflecting a statesmanlike effort to encourage but
72. 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2693-94.
75. Id. at 2694.
76. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Leaving Home? Domicile, Family, and Gender, 47 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1453, 1482-83 (2014) (situating Windsor as part of a trajectory within family law
that increasingly embraces "liberty, autonomy, and self-determination"); Gerken, supra note 60,
at 1990-91 (highlighting "Kennedy's ringing endorsement of the instrumental and expressive
benefits federalism has conferred on supporters of same-sex marriage"); Ernest A. Young & Erin
C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in United States v. Windsor, 2013 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 117, 133 (2013) (praising Windsor as "the best illustration we have of how structural
analysis," including federalism, "can-and should-inform individual rights"); Ernest A. Young,
United States v. Windsor and the Role of State Law in Defining Rights Claims, 99 VA. L. REV.
ONLINE 39, 45-47 (2013) ("[T]he crucial point is that in Windsor, the choice among competing
claims was made by the state of New York -not the U.S. Supreme Court. What the Court said was
simply that once New York had made its choice, Congress could not validly set that choice aside
by enacting DOMA."). For defenses of pluralism that go far beyond Windsor, see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Default Rules, and
Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1890-91, 1971-85 (2012); Jeffrey A. Redding, Dignity, Legal
Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 791, 832-39 (2010).
77. See, e.g., Cruz, supra note 59, at 44-47 (arguing that Windsor's invocation of federalism
would not prohibit the Court from striking down state marriage laws that discriminate against
same-sex couples); Joslin, supra note 60, at 168-72 (praising Windsor for not embracing categorical
family law federalism, which would have prevented federal attacks on state same-sex marriage
bans); Marcus, supra note 59, at 39-57 (arguing that the Court ultimately will rely on Windsor to
strike down state bans on same-sex marriage under the Fourteenth Amendment); Douglas
NeJaime, Windsor's Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219, 236-47 (2013) (analyzing the ways
Windsor is consistent with a fundamental right to marry for both same-sex and mixed-sex couples).
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not to coerce for the time being-to allow continued deliberation and
litigation over same-sex marriage in the states, and to move that
deliberation toward greater equality for same-sex couples and their
children."78 Commentators have thus embraced family pluralism not as
a good in and of itself but instead as a tool in the fight for marriage
equality. Despite the Court's reliance on states' diverse definitions of
family in both Capato and Windsor, family pluralism increasingly sits
in tension with the desire for more uniform and expansive definitions
of family across the states.
III. FEDERAL INTERVENTIONS
Although Capato and Windsor reveal some of the ways that
states continue to dictate family status, the federal government has also
increasingly regulated many of the incidents of family life. The
Supreme Court recognized this trend in Windsor, emphasizing that
"Congress, in enacting discrete statutes, can make determinations that
bear on marital rights and privileges."79 At times, such determinations
rest relatively easily alongside states' definitions of family. For
example, Congress has determined that otherwise valid state marriages
will not qualify a noncitizen spouse for legal immigration status if the
marriage was entered into for that purpose.80 Congress has also decided
to extend Social Security benefits to surviving spouses in common-law
marriages even if their domiciliary states did not recognize those
marriages.81 In each of these instances, the federal government confers
a uniquely federal benefit, minimizing conflict with states' conceptions
of family status.
At other times, however, federal law more directly conflicts with
state law, making it difficult to reconcile the federal approach with
states' conceptions of family formation and exit. As discussed in more
detail below, these conflicts existed before Capato and Windsor, and
78. Neil Siegel, Federalism as a Way Station: Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion, 6
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 7), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2396179, archived at http://perma.cc/79DN-KRDS; see also Michael J.
Klarman, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term-Comment: Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and
Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 129, 158 (2013) (arguing that the Justices in both Brown
and Windsor "hedged their decisions out of concern that broader rulings would have ignited
political backlash," but predicting that the Court will ultimately "extend [Windsor] to forbid the
states from excluding same-sex couples from marriage").
79. 133 S. Ct. at 2690.
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1) (2012).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(d)(2) (2012).
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they will likely continue to persist in the future. The Windsor decision
may even generate such conflicts, at least in the short run.
A. Federal Conflicts Before Capato and Windsor
One of the most perplexing conflicts between federal and state
regulation of family arises in the context of beneficiary designations for
pensions and certain life insurance policies governed by federal law. As
Robert Sitkoff has emphasized, "most pensions and life insurance
policies that are obtained as a benefit of employment are governed by
federal law, which preempts state law."82 This generally means that
some portion of a decedent's property will be distributed pursuant to
state law with the remainder distributed pursuant to federal law, often
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 83
This mix of state and federal law may lead to particularly
inconsistent results when a decedent divorced a spouse but failed to
revise beneficiary designations in the ex-spouse's name before death.84
Relying on the UPC,85 sixteen states have adopted divorce revocation
statutes, applicable to both probate and nonprobate property, that
revoke any predivorce designations to the ex-spouse.86 These statutes
are thought to reflect the decedent's presumed intent to sever all
support obligations upon divorce other than those mandated by divorce
decrees.87 ERISA and other federal statutes that create or regulate
beneficiary designations do not contain similar divorce revocation
provisions, however.
In 2001, in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, the Supreme Court held that
ERISA preempts states' divorce revocation statutes notwithstanding
ERISA's silence about the effects of divorce.88 The Court reasoned, in a
82. Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom ofDisposition, 58 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 643, 655 (2014).
83. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
and 29 U.S.C.).
84. John F. Langbein, Destructive Federal Preemption of State Wealth Transfer Law in
Beneficiary Designation Cases: Hillman Doubles Down on Egelhoff, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1666-
84 (2014); Waggoner, supra note 43, at 1638-42.
85. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 (amended 2010).
86. Langbein, supra note 84, at 1669-70.
87. Id. at 1669 ("What motivates the rule is the understanding that divorce commonly entails
a sufficiently traumatic breach in the relations of the former spouses that they are not likely
thereafter to intend to benefit each other by means of wealth transfer on death."). For all donative
instruments, the Restatement (Third) of Property emphasizes that "[t]he controlling consideration
in determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor's intention." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (2003).
88. 532 U.S 141, 147-50 (2001).
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seven-two decision, that the application of a state divorce revocation
statute would require plan administrators to "pay benefits to the
beneficiaries chosen by state law, rather than to those identified in the
plan document."89 Accordingly, the Court determined that the state
statute at issue would not operate in a gap of federal law but instead
would interfere with the payment of benefits, a central aspect of ERISA.
Because of this perceived conflict, the Court held that ERISA's silence
about divorce preempted the state divorce revocation statute otherwise
applicable to the decedent's estate.90 The pension at issue in Egelhoff
was therefore paid to the ex-spouse even though she was not eligible to
inherit the remainder of the decedent's estate governed by state law.
Commentators have extensively criticized Egelhoff for usurping
states' authority over family formation and exit,91 whether exit occurs
through divorce or death.92 As John Langbein writes, "[b]y treating
ERISA as preempting the state-law solution to a traditional state-law
issue, Egelhoff disrespects the long-standing allocation of responsibility
between the two legal systems."93 Moreover, "[b]y preventing state law
from doing its customary work of interpreting the meaning of
beneficiary designations, federal preemption needlessly defeats the core
policy of wealth transfer law, to implement transferor's intent."94
Last term, the Court returned to a similar issue. In Hillman v.
Maretta, the Court considered whether a decedent's surviving spouse
could bring a state court postdistribution action against the decedent's
ex-spouse who remained the beneficiary of the decedent's federally
regulated life insurance policy.95 The UPC, responding to Egelhoff,
89. Id. at 147.
90. Id. at 148.
91. See, e.g., T.P. Gallanis, ERISA and the Law of Succession, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 188-89
(2004) (finding Egelhoff troubling because it "opened the door to the wholesale nullification of
attempts at the state level to unify the law of probate and nonprobate transfers"); Susan N. Gary,
Applying Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes to Will Substitutes, 18 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 83, 113
(2004) (criticizing Egelhoff for confusing the preemption analysis, impeding state legislatures'
attempts to unify probate and nonprobate transfer-at-death laws, and "creat[ing] a significant gap
in the application of revocation-on-divorce statutes"); John H. Langbein, Major Reforms of the
Property Restatement and the Uniform Probate Code: Reformation, Harmless Error, and
Nonprobate Transfers, 38 ACTEC L.J. 1, 19-20 (2012) (asserting that the Egelhoff Court
incorrectly interpreted the language of ERISA and "ignored an easy way to get the right result");
Langbein, supra note 84, at 1677 ("Egelhoff disrespects the long standing allocation of
responsibility between the two legal systems.").
92. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L.
REV. 1227 passim (emphasizing that states' default property distribution rules often differ greatly
depending on whether a marriage ends by divorce or death).
93. Langbein, supra note 84, at 1677.
94. Id. at 1677.
95. 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1949 (2013).
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contemplates such an action grounded in principles of restitution,
specifying that an ex-spouse who receives a payment regulated by
federal law is "personally liable for the amount of the payment . . . to
the person who would have been entitled to it were [the state divorce
revocation statute] not preempted."96 The UPC provision therefore
assumes that "once account-level distribution has been made to the
person named in the federally regulated beneficiary designation, the
federal interest is satisfied, and there is no federal interest in intruding
on the operation of state wealth transfer law as regards the ultimate
entitlement to the asset."97 At issue in Hillman was a Virginia state
statute modeled after the UPC approach.98
A unanimous Supreme Court held, however, that the relevant
federal law preempted such postdistribution relief even though the law,
like ERISA, is silent about the effects of divorce upon plan
distribution.99 The Court agreed with the drafters of the UPC that
preemption would be inappropriate if administrative convenience had
been Congress's only concern in regulating the payment of the
insurance policy benefits at issue.100 Yet the Court determined that
Congress also had an implicit interest in ensuring that "the insurance
proceeds will be paid to the named beneficiary and that the beneficiary
can use them."101 The Court therefore held that Virginia's
postdistribution law "interfere [d] with Congress's objective that
insurance proceeds belong to the named beneficiary."102
To date, the reaction to Hillman has been similar to that of
Egelhoff. Commentators have deeply criticized Hillman as improperly
interpreting congressional silence and frustrating testator intent.103
96. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(h)(2) (amended 2010).
97. Langbein, supra note 84, at 1678.
98. Like the Uniform Probate Code, the relevant Virginia statute specifies that an ex-spouse
who receives such a payment is "personally liable for the amount of the payment to the person who
would have been entitled to it" but for preemption. VA. CODE ANN. §20-111.1(D) (2012).
99. 133 S. Ct. at 1955.
100. Id. at 1950.
101. Id. at 1953.
102. Id. at 1955.
103. See Langbein, supra note 84, at 1684 (criticizing Justice Thomas's concurrence for
characterizing the majority's interpretation of the statute as the "ordinary meaning" when in fact
that meaning "has been rejected by every American legislature that has considered the question"
of testator intent); Stewart E. Sterk & Melanie B. Leslie, Accidental Inheritance: Retirement
Accounts and the Hidden Law of Succession, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165, 199 (2014) (discussing Hillman
as an impediment to correcting testators' mistakes); Waggoner, supra note 43, at 1642 ("By
adopting the dubious 'belong to no other' interpretation of federal law, the Supreme Court has




Even more so, Hillman obstructs state legislative attempts to better
effectuate testator intent, no matter the form of the transfer upon
death. As Lawrence Waggoner bemoans, "the Court seemed unaware of
the decades-long movement toward unifying the law of probate and
nonprobate transfers, of which the divorce-revocation and post-
distribution rules are parts."10 4
Many commentators thus characterize Egelhoff and Hillman as
inappropriate federal interference with states' authority to govern the
distribution of family property at death, but the Supreme Court has yet
to agree. To the contrary, the Windsor Court cited Hillman as "one
example of the general principle that when the Federal Government
acts in the exercise of its own proper authority, it has a wide choice of
the mechanisms and means to adopt."105 In particular, "Congress has
the power both to ensure efficiency in the administration of its
programs and to choose what larger goals and policies to pursue."106 In
contrast to both Capato and Windsor, then, Egelhoff and Hillman hold
that the federal government need not defer to states' judgments
concerning family formation and exit. Indeed, when distributing assets
regulated by federal law, Congress may alter the terms of family exit,
producing outcomes in direct conflict with states' probate laws.
B. Federal Action After Capato and Windsor
Since Capato and Windsor, Congress has not further acted to
regulate family in any meaningful way. Yet the Obama Administration
and lower federal courts have seized upon the Windsor decision, relying
upon it to alter the balance between state and federal regulation of
marriage. Many federal benefits are now available to same-sex married
couples even if the couples' states of residence do not recognize their
marriages. 107 And several lower federal courts have relied on Windsor's
reasoning to invalidate state laws that fail to recognize same-sex
marriage.10 8 To varying extents, both of these developments challenge
the role of the states in determining who is married and who is not.
The Obama Administration's post- Windsor strategy represents
a relatively modest shift in the balance between state and federal
regulation of marriage. Where possible, the Administration now
104. Waggoner, supra note 43, at 1642.
105. 133 S. Ct. at 2690.
106. Id. For a brief discussion of Windsor's reliance on Hillman, see Mark Strasser, Windsor,
Federalism and the Future ofMarriage Litigation, 37 HARv. J.L. & GENDER ONLINE 1, 2-3 (2013).
107. See infra text accompanying notes 109-16.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 119-48
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bestows federal benefits on same-sex couples who travelled to another
state to legally marry because their states of residence continued to
limit marriage to mixed-sex couples. 109 The only exceptions involve the
few federal statutes that expressly limit federal benefits to couples
validly married in their states of domicile. 110 This "place-of-celebration"
approach thus permits same-sex couples to claim many of the federal
benefits attached to marriage even if the couples are not eligible for
state benefits.111 A federal bankruptcy court recently endorsed the
Administration's choice to focus on the place of celebration, finding a
same-sex couple to be spouses for purposes of federal bankruptcy law
even though their state of residence did not recognize their marriage. 112
To date, no court has found fault with this method of determining
marital status for purposes of federal law.
The Administration's reliance on the place of celebration is a
change from past practice, 113 but it still defers to state law, as couples
generally must be in a marriage considered valid by some state before
receiving federal benefits attaching to marriage.114 States' control of
marriage is thus preserved writ large, but states do not control the
validity of their residents' marriages for all purposes. Instead, other
states' views of marriage may provide a conduit for federal benefits,
undermining the domicile state's traditional authority to define
marriage1 1 5 but not states' authority in general. The proposed "Respect
109. For recent articles detailing the Administration's approach and analyzing its rationales
for doing so, see Joslin, supra note 60, at 171; Joseph Landau, Presidential Constitutionalism and
Civil Rights, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1719, 1760-61 (2014); Meg Penrose, Something to /Lex Loci]
Celebrationis?: Federal Marriage Benefits Following United States v. Windsor, 41 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 41, 44-45 (2013); Deborah A. Widiss, Leveling Up After DOMA, 89 IND. L.J. 43, 51-
54 (2014).
110. The Social Security Act limits benefits to couples legally married in their states of
domicile unless they meet the limited exceptions set forth in note 52, supra. See Astrue v. Capato,
132 S. Ct. 2021, 2031 (2012) ("The Act commonly refers to state law on matters of family status.");
Joslin, supra note 60, at 171 n.98 ("Benefits that likely will be denied to same-sex spouses who live
in nonrecognition states include Social Security spousal benefits.").
111. See Widiss, supra note 109, at 53-54 (noting that, as a result of the place-of-celebration
rule, "many key federal marriage benefits are now available to same-sex married couples even if
they live in states with marriage bans").
112. In re Matson, 509 B.R. 860, 863-64 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2014).
113. For extensive background discussion, see William Baude, BeyondDOMA: Choice of State
Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1390-92 (2012).
114. See Joslin, supra note 60, at 173 (emphasizing that a place of celebration approach "still
looks to and defers to state law-it just directs to which state law the federal government should
defer"). The primary exception would be the limited instances, discussed supra note 52, in which
a surviving spouse may be eligible for Social Security benefits even in the absence of a marriage
recognized by a state.
115. See Joslin, supra note 60, at 173 (positing that because "the domicile state is the state
that was historically understood to have the greatest interest in any particular marriage, . . . one
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for Marriage Act" would extend this approach even further by amending
the U.S. Code to define a person as "married" for all federal purposes "if
that individual's marriage is valid in the State where the marriage was
entered into."116 The Respect for Marriage Act would thus impose a
place-of-celebration rule for all federal purposes, supplanting the few
statutes that currently mandate a domicile approach to marital
recognition, but it too would require couples to be in a marriage
recognized by some state.
One scholar, Deborah Widiss, has proposed a somewhat more
radical change to existing law. Widiss argues that the federal
government could better, and more equally, address the needs of same-
sex couples by developing a federal marriage registry.117 Under this
approach, couples seeking federal marriage benefits would need to meet
the requirements of the federal registry, but they would not need to be
in a marriage recognized by a state. The registry would therefore bypass
the states altogether, looking solely to federal law to determine
marriage validity. The registry, however, would do so for purposes of
federal law only; states would retain the ability to define and regulate
marriage for purposes of state law. Widiss's proposal is thus more
radical than place-of-celebration approaches, but it would not usurp the
states' traditional role in defining marriage for many purposes.
Lower federal courts have gone much further post- Windsor,
requiring many states to recognize same-sex marriage on the same
terms as mixed-sex marriage for purposes of state law. Indeed, only one
of the many federal courts that have considered the issue of same-sex
marriage since Windsor has deferred to states' authority to define
marriage or otherwise upheld the validity of mixed-sex marriage
requirements.118 Every other federal court to date has required states
to recognize same-sex marriage despite state legislation, referenda, or
constitutional language defining marriage as between one man and one
woman. These cases therefore represent an unprecedented federal foray
into marriage law.
Relying on Windsor's anti-discrimination rhetoric, these federal
court decisions have taken multiple forms, with several district courts
certainly could at least argue that adopting a place of celebration rule for purposes of all federal
benefits 'undermines the [domicile] States' sovereign authority to define, regulate, and support
family relationships' ").
116. Id. at 171-73; see also Baude, supra note 113, at 1417-18 (endorsing passage ofthe act).
117. Widiss, supra note 109, at 56-61.
118. Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 927-28 (E.D. La. 2014) (holding that
Louisiana's mixed-sex marriage requirements do not violate the U.S. Constitution). The court
emphasized that "[flederalism is not extinct. Federalism remains a vibrant and essential
component of our nation's constitutional structure." Id. at 927.
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ruling before circuit courts issued binding precedent. First, federal
district courts ordered states to extend partial benefits to some same-
sex couples. In the earliest case, a federal district court in Ohio'19
required that state to extend certain marriage-based inheritance
benefits to a petitioning same-sex couple that had legally wed in
Maryland. Federal district courts in Michigan1 20 and Arizonal 21
subsequently issued similar rulings.
Second, the federal district court in Ohio thereafter held,122 as
did federal district courts in Indiana,123 Kentucky, 124 and Tennessee,1 25
that each of those states must generally recognize at least some same-
sex marriages validly celebrated in other states. These holdings were
not limited to specific benefits related to marriage; instead, they
mandated recognition of valid same-sex marriages for all state
purposes. Third, federal district courts in Illinois, 126 Kentucky, 127
119. Obergefellv. Kasich, No. 1:13-cv-501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *7 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013),
aff'd sub nom. Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 997-98 (S.D. Ohio 2013). In the case,
the Southern District of Ohio issued a restraining order requiring Ohio to recognize the out-of-
state marriage of James Obergefell and John Arthur for purposes of Arthur's death certificate.
Shortly after Windsor, the couple traveled to Maryland in a medically equipped aircraft (required
by Arthur's advanced amyotrophic lateral sclerosis), got married on the tarmac without leaving
the jet, and then immediately flew back to Ohio. Despite Ohio law prohibiting the recognition of
same-sex marriages, the district court ordered that, upon Arthur's impending death, his death
certificate record his status as "married" and name Obergefell as his "surviving spouse." Arthur
died several weeks later, and Ohio issued his death certificate in accordance with the court's order.
For more discussion and criticism of the case, see Appleton, supra note 7, at 1451-53. For
additional criticism, see William Baude, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage After
Windsor, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 150, 159 (2013) ("[W]hen a couple lives in a state that does not
recognize same-sex marriage, they do not have a constitutional right to force that state to recognize
a marriage celebrated during a brief trip.").
120. Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939, 962-73 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (enjoining the
enforcement of a state law that prohibited public employers from offering medical and other fringe
benefits to the same-sex partners of employees).
121. Majors v. Jeanes, No. 2:14-cv-00518, 2014 WL4541173, at *6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 12, 2014)
(temporarily restraining the state of Arizona from enforcing its mixed-sex marriage requirements
with respect to the plaintiff and ordering the state to issue a death certificate listing the plaintiff
as the surviving spouse of his deceased husband).
122. Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-cv-129, 2014 WL 1418395, at *18 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2014).
123. Baskin v. Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1029-30 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
124. Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 552-53 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
125. Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759, 768-72 (M.D. Tenn. 2014) (enjoining the
enforcement of Tennessee's anti-recognition law with respect to the named plaintiffs).
126. Gray v. Orr, 4 F. Supp. 3d 984, 993-94 (N.D. Ill. 2013), aff'd on other grounds, Lee v. Orr,
No. 13-cv-8719, 2014 WL 683680, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014). The state of Illinois had already
passed legislation recognizing same-sex marriage, but it was not scheduled to go into effect until
June 1, 2014. The federal court rulings required Cook County to issue marriage licenses to same-
sex couples prior to that date.
127. Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 550 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
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Michigan,128 Oklahoma,129 Oregon,130 Utah,131 Virginia,132 and
Wisconsin1 33 held that those states must issue marriage licenses to
same-sex couples on the same terms available to mixed-sex couples.
Once again, these holdings were not limited to specific marriage-related
benefits; instead, the district courts mandated that those states set the
same threshold requirements for marriage for same-sex and mixed-sex
couples and treat those couples identically once those requirements are
met. Finally, federal district courts in Colorado, 134 Florida, 135 Idaho, 136
Pennsylvania,137 and Texas138 adopted a combination of the last two
paths just discussed, requiring those states both to recognize same-sex
marriages validly celebrated in other states and to issue their own
marriage licenses without regard to sex.
To date, the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have
upheld the rulings governing Virginia, 139 Indiana, 140 Wisconsin, 14 1
Idaho,14 2 Oklahoma,143 and Utah,144 while appeals are pending in the
other circuits. In striking down each state's mixed-sex marriage
128. DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
129. Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296-97 (N. D. Okla. 2014).
130. Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1147-48 (D. Or. 2014).
131. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1215-16 (D. Utah 2013).
132. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014).
133. Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1028 (W.D. Wis. 2014).
134. Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14scv-01817, 2014 WL 3634834, at *4 (D. Colo. July 23,
2014).
135. Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1293 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
136. Latta v. Otter, No. 1:13-cv-00482, 2014 WL 1909999, at *29 (D. Idaho May 13, 2014).
137. Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431-32 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
138. De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 665-66 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
139. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014). After the Fourth Circuit's mandate
was issued, a federal district court in North Carolina required that state to recognize same-sex
marriages validly celebrated in other states and to issue marriage licenses without regard to sex.
Gen. Synod ofthe United Church of Christ v. Cooper, No. 3:14-cv-00213, 2014 WL 5092288, at *1
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 10, 2014).
140. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 658, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2014).
141. Id.
142. Latta v. Otter, Nos. 14-35420, 14-35421, 12-17668, 2014 WL 4977682, at *10-11 (9th
Cir. Oct. 7, 2014). The Ninth Circuit also reversed a holding from the District of Nevada, decided
before Windsor, upholding Nevada's mixed-sex marriage requirement. Id. at *1, 11. After the
Ninth Circuit's ruling, federal district courts in Alaska and Arizona required those states to
recognize same-sex marriages validly celebrated in other states and to issue their own marriage
licenses without regard to sex. Hamby v. Parnell, No. 3:14-cv-00089, 2014 WL 5089399, at *5-8
(D. Alaska, Oct. 12, 2014); Connolly v. Jeanes, No. 2:14-cv-00024, 2014 WL 5320642, at *1 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 17, 2014).
143. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1081-82 (10th Cir. 2014).
144. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F. 3d 1193, 1229-30 (10th Cir. 2014). After the Tenth Circuit's
rulings, a district court in Wyoming enjoined that state from enforcing its mixed-sex marriage
requirements. Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-CV-200, 2014 WL 5317797, at *9 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 2014).
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requirements, the majority opinions from these circuits have not
expressed concern about usurping states' authority to define marriage.
The Fourth Circuit rejected Virginia's argument that federalism
protected the right of its citizens to make a "policy choice in a legal
arena that is fraught with intense social and political debate."145 The
Tenth Circuit similarly rejected any federalism concerns, emphasizing
that Windsor was decided on liberty rather than federalism grounds. 146
As such, the court stressed that "the experimental value
of federalism cannot overcome plaintiffs' rights to due process and equal
protection."14 7 Dissenting judges in the Fourth and Tenth Circuits
criticized the majorities for failing to grapple with the resulting shift in
the balance between state and federal power. As Judge Kelly of the
Tenth Circuit wrote, "[i]f the States are the laboratories of democracy,
requiring every state to recognize same-gender unions-contrary to the
views of its electorate and representatives-turns the notion of a
limited national government on its head."14 8 The unanimous Seventh
and Ninth Circuit opinions ignored these concerns altogether.
All of these decisions endorse a greater federal role in marriage
regulation than Windsor expressly contemplated. Most saliently, they
substitute a uniform definition of marriage for those promulgated
through state referenda or state legislative processes. Windsor
acknowledged that "[s]tate laws defining and regulating marriage, of
course, must respect the constitutional rights of persons,"14 9 and many
of the federal court opinions have seized upon that language.15 0 Yet the
145. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 379 (4th Cir. 2014).
146. Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1206-08.
147. Id. at 1228.
148. Id. at 1231 (Kelly, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also id. at 1240
(criticizing the majority's approach for nationalizing the regulation of marriage, "in direct
contravention of the law of comity between states and its uncontroversial corollary that marriage
laws necessarily vary from state to state"). Judge Niemeyer of the Fourth Circuit expressed a
similar viewpoint: "The U.S. Constitution does not, in my judgment, restrict the States' policy
choices on this issue. If given the choice, some States will surely recognize same-sex marriage and
some will surely not. But that is, to be sure, the beauty of federalism." Bostic, 760 F.3d at 398
(Neimeyer, J., dissenting).
149. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967)). As such, the federal oversight of marriage may be rooted in the principle of
coextensivity, which extends federal court authority "to all questions of federal law, including those
that implicate constitutional guarantees," including those that arise in the probate or domestic
relations context. James E. Pfander & Michael J.T. Downey, In Search of the Probate Exception,
67 VAND. L. REV. 1533, 1548-52 (2014).
150. See, e.g., Bostic, 760 F.3d at 379 ("Windsor does not teach us that federalism principles
can justify depriving individuals of their constitutional rights; it reiterates Loving 's admonition
that the states must exercise their authority without trampling constitutional guarantees.");
Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1228 (relying on Windsor to support its statement that "the experimental
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Windsor majority followed that statement with three additional
paragraphs affirming the states' role in defining marriage.151 Among
other things, the Court emphasized that "[t]he definition of marriage is
the foundation of the State's broader authority to regulate the subject
of domestic relations." 
152
The federal court opinions issued after Windsor call that
foundation into doubt. Because Windsor concerned a federal statute,
the Supreme Court did not consider the validity of variations in states'
marriage laws. Instead, after briefly reviewing differences in states'
minimum age requirements and consanguinity limits, the Court
emphasized that "these rules are in every event consistent within each
State."153 The Court's focus was thus on DOMA's disruption of intra-
state uniformity. Since Windsor, federal courts have shifted the focus
from intrastate uniformity to inter-state uniformity, invoking the
Constitution to force states to adopt a particular definition of marriage
even though Windsor did not expressly mandate that result.154 With
these opinions, states' abilities to promote pluralistic conceptions of
marriage are now in great doubt.155 As the Western District of
value of federalism cannot overcome plaintiffs' rights to due process and equal protection"); DeBoer
v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 774 (E.D. Mich. 2014) ("Taken together, both
the Windsor and Loving decisions stand for the proposition that, without some overriding
legitimate interest, the state cannot use its domestic relations authority to legislate families out
of existence."); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 657 (W.D. Tex. 2014) ("While Texas has the
,unquestioned authority' to regulate and define marriage, the State must nevertheless do so in a
way that does not infringe on an individual's constitutional rights." (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
at 2693)).
151. 133 S. Ct. at 2691-92.
152. Id. at 2691.
153. Id. at 2692.
154. Id. at 2696 (purporting to confine its holding to those already in "lawful marriages").
155. Of course, pluralism means that some states, like New York, may decide to recognize
same-sex marriage on their own. Since Windsor, the Supreme Court of New Mexico and lower state
courts in Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Missouri, and New Jersey have struck down
state laws limiting marriage to mixed-sex couples or enjoined state officials from enforcing them.
Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 888-89 (N.M. 2013); Wright v. State, No. 60CV-13-2662, 2014 WL
1908815, at *8 (Ark. Cir. Ct. May 9, 2014); Brinkman v. Long, No. 13-CV-32572, 14-CV-30731,
2014 WL 3408024, at *26 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jul. 9, 2014); In re Estate of Bangor, No.
502014CP001857XXXXMB (Fla. Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Cnty. Aug. 5, 2014), available at https://
www. scribd.com/doc/235973877/Palmbeach-Order, archived at http://perma.cc/UC52-UP84;
Costanza v. Caldwell, No. 2013-0052 D2 (La. Dist. Ct. Sept. 22, 2014), available at http://
www.afer.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Louisiana-Costanza.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
4GFV-3VBT; Barrier v. Vasterling, No. 1416-CV-03892, 2014 WL 4966467, at *9 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Oct.
3, 2014); Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 368-69 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2013). The Hawaii
state legislature also passed a Marriage Equality Act, authorizing same-sex marriage, which has
survived constitutional challenges in state court. See Derrick DePledge, Challenge to Marriage
Equality Law Rejected, HONOLULU STAR-ADVERTISER (Jan. 30, 2014),
http://www.staradvertiser.com/newspremium/20140130_samesex-marriageChallenge-to-newl1
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Wisconsin emphasized, "[s]tates may not 'experiment' with different
social policies by violating constitutional rights."156
IV. VISIONS OF PRIVATE FAMILY SUPPORT
Especially after Windsor, questions remain about when the
federal government will defer to states' definitions of family and when
it will impose its own definitions. The balance between state and federal
authority over family matters is therefore in flux. The Court may have
endorsed states' diverse approaches to defining family in both Capato
and Windsor, but federal agencies and courts are moving toward
national uniformity on the issue of same-sex marriage. Moreover, critics
of Capato argue that the federal government should similarly adopt a
uniform approach to posthumously conceived children regardless of the
intestacy laws of their deceased parents' domiciliary states. States'
authority to define family is thus in doubt.
It is too soon to tell whether this flux portends a permanent shift
in the allocation of authority to define family. The contested terrain
provides an opportunity, however, to examine why the federal
government might continue to defer to states' definitions of family and
why it might not. A hierarchy of values emerges, one that ultimately
may better elucidate why the government-whether federal or state-
recognizes family at all. At the top of this hierarchy lies neither state
sovereignty nor principles of equality or dignity. Instead, as set forth
below, government recognition of family ultimately appears rooted in
the desire to privatize the dependencies of family members,
encouraging families to "take care of their own" with minimal financial
assistance from the state.
A. A Hierarchy of Values
The rhetoric in Windsor suggests that federalism continues to
play an important role in legal recognition of family. This importance
is, in part, a "matter of history and tradition, "157 but deference to states'
authority to define family also does more than preserve the status quo.
aw is rejected.html?id=242717861. A lower state court in Tennessee, however, refused to require
the state to recognize same-sex marriages validly celebrated in other states. Borman v. Pyles-
Borman, No. 2014CV36, 2014 WL 4251133, at *6 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2014).
156. Wolfv. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 994 (W.D. Wis. 2014).
157. 133 S. Ct. at 2691. As discussed in the sources cited supra note 4, however, the history
of family regulation is in fact more nuanced, with the federal government sporadically intervening
since the founding and increasingly intervening over the past century.
1860 [Vol. 67:6:1835
PRIVATE FAMILY SUPPORT
Proponents of federalism emphasize that deference to states' authority
honors local values, furthering both family pluralism and the presumed
intent of family members in diverse communities.158 As Windsor
stressed, "[t]he dynamics of state government in the federal system are
to allow the formation of consensus respecting the way the members of
a discrete community treat each other in their daily contact and
constant interaction with each other."159 The federalist approach to
family definition thereby contemplates that the different states may
adopt different approaches to family status, fostering diversity,
pluralism, and respect for local norms.
Yet Windsor twice emphasized that these values of federalism
must give way to "constitutional guarantees."160 Of course, the general
principle of federalism is also set forth in the Constitution.161 The
Windsor Court's qualification of the federalist approach to defining
family thus suggests that some constitutional guarantees are more
important than others. As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the Court
might have viewed the "rights of persons" as trumping the rights of
states.162 Alternatively, the Court might have been responding to
"enormous changes in the surrounding social and political contexts,"
fashioning an approach with little concern for doctrine-federalist or
otherwise. 163
In either event, the Windsor Court's subsequent descriptions of
the "dignity" of the marital relationship provide a basis to prioritize
equal access to marital status and benefits over states' diverse
definitions of family. In just four pages, the Court used the word
"dignity" eight times and other variations of the word three times.164 In
158. See sources cited supra note 6.
159. 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
160. Id. at 2692 ("[T]he incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all
married couples within each State, though they may vary, subject to constitutional guarantees,
from one State to the next."); id. ("The States' interest in defining and regulating the marital
relation, subject to constitutional guarantees, stems from the understanding that marriage is more
than a routine classification for purposes of certain statutory benefits.").
161. U.S. CONST. Amend. X.
162. 133 S. Ct. at 2691 ("State laws defining and regulating marriage, of course, must respect
the constitutional rights of persons."). For more discussion of this possibility, see Young, supra
note 76, at 41-43, 47.
163. Klarman, supra note 78, at 130.
164. 133 S. Ct. at 2692-96. For additional discussions of Justice Kennedy s deployment of
dignity, see Ben-Asher, supra note 64, at 258-70 ("Windsor is a pivotal moment in the
metamorphosis of the legal homosexual. The legal homosexual, at least in states where same-sex
marriage is legally recognized, is portrayed as a morally dignified person."); Rao, supra note 64, at
33-38 ("In Windsor, however, the dignitary harm is the harm - the harm of not being properly
recognized and of lacking the proper federal status."); Kenji Yoshino, The Anti-Humiliation
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doing so, the Court emphasized the importance of marriage to
individual liberty and personhood without articulating, or even
mentioning, a fundamental right to marry. 165 In the Court's analysis,
the importance of equal access to marriage instead naturally flows from
marriage's dignity-conferring effects.166
Because Windsor concerned a federal statute, this dignity and
equality analysis could rest easily alongside the Court's federalism
rhetoric. Indeed, the Court explicitly linked the two values:
By its recognition of the validity of same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions
and then by authorizing same-sex unions and same-sex marriages, New York sought to
give further protection and dignity to that bond. For same-sex couples who wished to be
married, the State acted to give their lawful conduct a lawful status. This status is a far-
reaching legal acknowledgment of the intimate relationship between two people, a
relationship deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other
marriages. It reflects both the community's considered perspective on the historical roots
of the institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of
equality. 167
But lower federal courts and most commentators have seen little reason
to limit Windsor's dignity analysis to the context of federal benefits. The
Court itself categorized its federalism discussion as "background" and
emphasized that "[t]he State's power in defining the marital relation is
of central relevance in the case quite apart from principles of
federalism."168
Windsor thereby creates the conditions for federal agencies and
lower federal courts to prioritize individual liberty and equality over
Principle and Same-Sex Marriage, 123 YALE L.J. 3076, 3082-88 (2014) ("In Windsor, Justice
Kennedy doubled down ... mentioning the word "dignity" or "indignity" almost a dozen times.").
165. In this way, Windsor differs from Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S 1, 12 (1967), and other
Supreme Court cases deploying the language of fundamental rights when considering marriage
restrictions. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-99 (1987) ("[Petitioners] concede that the
decision to marry is a fundamental right under Zablocki. . . ."); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
387 (1978) (noting the "fundamental character" of the right to marry).
166. For discussions of how the Court has previously promoted equality through analyses of
dignity and liberty, see Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The 'Fundamental Right" That
Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1893, 1902-16 (2004) (analyzing "[t]he Lawrence
Court's blend of equal protection and substantive due process themes"); Kenji Yoshino, The New
Equal Protection, 124 HARv. L. REV. 747, 749-50 (2011) (describing how the Court has "long used
the Due Process Clauses to further equality concerns" and, more recently, "has shut doors in its
equality jurisprudence in the name of pluralism anxiety and opened doors in its liberty
jurisprudence to compensate").
167. 133 S. Ct. at 2692-93. In this way, the Court also builds upon the intimacy rhetoric of
Lawrence v. Texas, 539U.S. 558, 567 (2003). For a critique of that rhetoric, see Laura A. Rosenbury
& Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 811, 823-35 (2010)
(challenging "the underlying assumption in Lawrence that sex is valuable only when potentially
in service to emotional intimacy").
168. 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
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federalism. When considering challenges to states' definitions of family,
the values of federalism and dignity can no longer easily coexist.
Instead, a choice must be made. Although federalism remains
important, developments since Windsor suggest that federalism is no
match for the "recognition, dignity, and protection" that flow from equal
access to legal marital status.169 As the Eastern District of Virginia
emphasized, "[n]otwithstanding the wisdom usually residing within
proper deference to state authorities regarding domestic relations,
judicial vigilance is a steady beacon searching for an ever-more perfect
justice and truer freedoms for our country's citizens."170
Yet if the dignity and equality of potential family members are
more important than the values underlying federalism, the Court's
holding in Capato becomes suspect. There, the Court prioritized states'
ability to determine family status over the equal treatment of
posthumously conceived children. Most commentators believe that
Capato was wrongly decided,171 arguing that children should not
receive different treatment based on the circumstances of their
births. 172 Such criticism builds upon Supreme Court precedent holding
that children should not be punished for the sins of their parents,1 73
including in the context of childbirth outside of marriage.1 7 4
Commentators thus argue that both state and federal law should
employ expansive and uniform definitions of "child," making virtually
all posthumously conceived offspring equally eligible for state and
federal benefits. 175
169. Id.
170. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 477 (E.D. Va. 2014).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
172. See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 45, at 1112 ("[I]t is hard to see why discrimination against
a subclass of posthumously born infants is more justifiable than discrimination against
all posthumously born infants, when the subclass has no rational relation to the child. No amount
of creative subclassing can save [Capato] from its denial of equal protection.").
173. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) ("Even if the State found it expedient to
control the conduct of adults by acting against their children, legislation directing the onus of a
parent's misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of
justice.").
174. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 406 U.S. 164, 172-75 (1972) ("[N]o child is responsible
for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of
deterring the parent."); Levy v. Louisana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding that "it is invidious to
discriminate against [illegitimate children] when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is
possibly relevant to" their claims for damages for the wrongful death of their mother); see also
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (asserting that DOMA "humiliates tens of thousands of children now
being raised by same-sex couples").
175. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120 (amended 2010) (setting forth broad definitions of
'parent" and "child" when women who are not gestational carriers conceive children by means of
assisted reproduction, including when they conceive using the sperm of deceased husbands or
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Few have heeded such calls for reform, however. Capato, unlike
Windsor, has not inspired litigation or proposed legislation seeking to
promulgate a nationally uniform definition of "child." Several possible
explanations exist for this inaction. From a political-economy and
social-movement perspective, children have less access to the legislative
process, and their interests have not generally inspired large-scale
support for change, particularly in the United States.176 From a
doctrinal perspective, although the Supreme Court has held that state
classifications on the basis of illegitimacy are unconstitutional,177 many
federal and state laws continue to tie benefits for children to the ongoing
marriage of their parents.178 The failure to promulgate a uniform
definition of "child" post-Capato therefore could have very little to do
with the hierarchy of values underlying family recognition.
Yet even if these possibilities explain the dearth of litigation and
proposed legislation post-Capato, Capato still reveals that the values of
equality and dignity do not always trump the values of federalism. In
accordance with the federal Social Security Act, the Social Security
partners within a certain period of time after death); Benjamin C. Carpenter, A Chip Off the Old
Iceblock: How Cryopreservation Has Changed Estate Law, Why Attempts to Address the Issue Have
Fallen Short, and How to Fix It, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 347, 404-30 (2011) (recommending
that legislatures recognize posthumously conceived children for purposes of class gifts and
probate); Jennifer Matystik, Posthumously Conceived Children: Why States Should Update Their
Intestacy Laws After Astrue v. Capato, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 269, 279-92 (2013) ("It
does seem problematic, if not absurd, to give benefits to a child conceived by a terminally ill father
shortly before his death, but not if the child were conceived the day after his death .... ); Raymond
C. O'Brien, The Momentum of Posthumous Conception: A Model Act, 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 332, 366-85 (2009) (analyzing and praising the Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive
Technology approved by the American Bar Association in 2008, which, among other things,
provides a mechanism for recognizing posthumously conceived children).
176. Indeed, the United States is one of only two nations (along with Somalia) that have
refused to adopt the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
177. See Weber, 406 U.S. at 175-76; Levy, 391 U.S. at 71-72.
178. See, e.g., Susan Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex: Old and New, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 347, 349, 365-83 (2012) (analyzing "doctrinal differences between the parentage rules
for children conceived sexually outside marriage and those for children conceived without sex, by
assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), outside marriage"); Cynthia Grant Bowman, The New
Illegitimacy: Children of Cohabitating Couples and Stepchildren, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y
& L. 437, 437-40 (2012) ("Historically, illegitimate children were punished because their parents
were unmarried. The children of opposite-sex cohabiting couples are disadvantaged in similar
ways today, and, to a lesser extent, so are stepchildren."); Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage
for Social Policy, 11 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 307, 307, 357-59 (2004) (analyzing the "use of marriage
as a proxy for desirable outcomes in social policy"); Melissa Murray, What's So New About the New
Illegitimacy, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 387, 389-99, 412-20 (2012) ("debunk[ing] the
inherited legal progress narrative that claims that law abandoned the common law's treatment of
illegitimacy and its many legal disadvantages in favor of a more liberal legal regime in which those
of illegitimate birth were no longer legally disfavored" and highlighting ongoing "legal
disadvantages for non-marital births").
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Administration continues to defer to states' definitions of "child" despite
the unequal treatment that results. This outcome does not mean that
federalism is the ultimate value in this context, however. Instead, when
read in conjunction with Windsor, Capato suggests that legal
recognition of family hinges on a third interest, above and beyond both
federalism and individual rights. As set forth below, both Windsor and
Capato are consistent with the long-standing goal of privatizing the
dependencies of family members.
B. The Ultimate Value of Private Family Support
Legal family recognition involves more than a negative right to
be free from government intrusion. If equal rights to liberty were the
only value at stake, the Supreme Court's analysis in Lawrence v. Texas,
invalidating criminal prohibitions on same-sex sodomy, would have
logically controlled the outcome in Windsor.179 That Lawrence did not
control Windsor's outcome highlights the ways that legal family
recognition involves not only equal liberty and dignity but also an
affirmative right to preferential government treatment.180 Given the
rarity of affirmative rights in the United States, it behooves us to ask
why the government, whether state or federal, recognizes particular
family statuses at all, rather than simply permitting individuals to form
179. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that same-sex petitioners'
'right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their [sexual]
conduct without intervention of the government" while also emphasizing that the case did "not
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter").
180. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 426 (Cal. 2008) ("[T]he constitutional right
to marry . .. goes beyond what is sometimes characterized as simply a 'negative' right insulating
the couple's relationship from overreaching governmental intrusion or interference, and includes
a 'positive' right to have the state take at least some affirmative action to acknowledge and support
the family unit."); Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex
Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1204 (2004) (arguing that
an affirmative right to state recognition of marriage is an "important exception" to the usual
understanding of the Constitution as conferring only negative rights); Elizabeth S. Scott, A World
Without Marriage, 41 FAm. L. Q. 537, 545 (2007) (stressing that, unlike "negative rights that
protect citizens from excessive intrusion by the state in protected activities, such as the right of
free speech, religion, or family privacy, . . . the right to enter civil marriage is an affirmative right,
defined solely by the government's creation of the licensing system and of the status with its
attendant legal attributes"); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Let's Call the Whole Thing Off Can States
Abolish the Institution of Marriage?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 697, 707 (2010) (arguing that "the 'right to
marry' has come to be at least a quasi-affirmative right: one which the state has some obligation
at least to record").
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the intimate associations of their choice without government
interference.181
This inquiry reveals the ultimate value underlying legal
recognition of family: the value of private family support. The
government affirmatively recognizes certain intimate relationships, to
the exclusion of others, in order to incentivize individuals to privately
address the dependencies that often arise when adults care for children
and for one another. Indeed, states originally recognized marriage and
the parent-child relationship as a means to encourage men to assume
responsibility for women's and children's dependencies.182 Today, "the
state incentivizes marriage and ensures that marital partners provide
care and support for one another"183 in a less obviously gendered
manner. As post- Windsor developments reveal, one man and one
woman are increasingly not required; instead, almost any two
consenting adults will do. Yet even as our understandings of family
roles and composition have changed, legal recognition of family status
remains rooted in the privatization of dependency. 184
The government therefore recognizes and bestows benefits on
families so that they will serve a private welfare function, minimizing
181. Cf Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 667, 695 (2010) (arguing
that there is a negative right to "(equal) liberty in setting up households" but not an affirmative
right to state recognition of marriage).
182. See COTT, supra note 51, at 7 ("[A] man's full civil and political status consisted of his
being a husband and father and head of a household unit . . . his taking the responsibility for
dependent wife and children, qualified him to be a participating member of a state."); Melissa E.
Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 (2012) ("[M]arriage would absolve the
state of the responsibility for supporting those ruined by seduction and any illegitimate offspring
resulting from such liaisons."); Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 498-503 (1992) (analyzing how family law channels individuals into
marriage in order to serve multiple normative goals, including the marital "duty of support" and
the support and protection of children).
183. NeJaime, supra note 77, at 230.
184. Although recent same-sex marriage cases rarely make this point explicitly, the
privatization of dependency pervades court's descriptions of marriage and its functions. For two
examples, see Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 661 (7th Cir. 2014) ("[E]ncouraging marriage is less
about forcing fathers to take responsibility for their unintended children-state law has
mechanisms for determining paternity and requiring the father to contribute to the support of his
children-than about enhancing child welfare by encouraging parents to commit to a stable
relationship in which they will be raising the child together."); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921, 961 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ("Marriage is the state recognition and approval of a couple's
choice ... to remain committed to one another and to form a household based on their own feelings
about one another and to join in an economic partnership and support one another and any
dependents."). Earlier cases concerning children born outside ofmarriage more explicitly embraced




reliance on state and federal coffers.18 5 Family law in the United States
is a "neoliberal family law," in the words of Anne Alstott, rooted in the
"three core ideals" of "negative liberty, laissez-faire market
distributions, and the minimal state."186 Instead of bestowing positive
rights "to cash welfare, to housing, or to education,"18 7 states bestow the
status of spouse, parent, or child and attach limited benefits to them.
Indeed, the most robust benefit may be the right to family privacy, a
negative right available only to those who opt into legal family status.18 8
In exchange for this privacy, families are largely expected to address
their own needs; if they do not, the state often intervenes in a punitive
fashion.1 89
Both Capato and Windsor reinforce this relationship between
legal family status and private family support. In Capato, the
unanimous Court emphasized that its statutory approach conformed to
"Congress'[s] perception of the core purpose" of the Social Security
Act. 190 That purpose "was not to create a program 'generally benefiting
needy persons,'" but instead was to "provide ... dependent members of
[a wage earner's] family with protection against the hardship
occasioned by [the] loss of [the insured's] earnings."191 In other words,
benefits are available only after a wage earner takes on the obligations
of dependency through legal family status and then is unable to meet
those obligations because of death. The Court then linked states'
185. See Janet E. Halley, What is Family Law? A Genealogy, Part II, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
189, 259, 290 (2011) (describing how family law casebooks in the nineteen-sixties emphasized that
"the family is a crucial private welfare system," and analyzing the ways modern family law
casebooks, by distinguishing family law from poverty law or welfare law, "obscure[ ] the state's
constant, conscious use of the family as a private welfare system"); Murray, supra note 178, at 433
(describing marriage as "the de facto social safety net through which the needs of vulnerable
individuals are accommodated").
186. Anne Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez-Faire
Markets in the Minimal State, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2459972, archived at http://perma.cc/5AW8-SEEG.
187. Id. at 5.
188. See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 864-
86 (2007) (analyzing how the state regulates the legal family upon formation and perceived
breakdown, "removing the [legal] family as an entity from the zone of state power" at all other
times).
189. See, e.g., Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 113, 153 (2011) ("Economic self-sufficiency is the unspoken condition of possibility upon
which state noninterference rests.").
190. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2032 (2012).
191. Id.; see also Bowman, supra note 178, at 455 (emphasizing that "children of unmarried
parents are required to demonstrate actual dependency upon the wage earner at the time of death"
in order to receive Social Security benefits, whereas such dependency "is presumed in the case of
legitimate children who are minors").
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intestacy laws to states' judgments about a child's presumed
dependency, characterizing "eligibility to inherit under state intestacy
law as a workable substitute for burdensome case-by-case
determinations [of] whether the child was, in fact, dependent on her
father's earnings."192
Dependency, rather than a child's dignity or equality, or a
deceased parent's presumed intent, was thus the Capato Court's
primary focus. Once the Court so framed its inquiry, it could more easily
defer to states' own methods for incentivizing private family support by
setting the terms of legal family status. States' choices about
recognizing posthumously conceived children as legal "children"
therefore do not simply reflect equal, or unequal, treatment or the
ability to keep up with technological change. Instead, those choices also
reflect states' reasoned opinions about children's dependencies and the
best ways to allocate responsibility for those dependencies between
private family members and government coffers.
In Windsor, the Court also acknowledged the role of family
members in providing support to one another, thereby privatizing
dependency. The Court viewed marriage as "more than a routine
classification for purposes of certain statutory benefits."193 Instead,
"duties and responsibilities" are also "an essential part of married
life."194 Indeed, the Windsor Court explicitly tied legal family status to
family responsibilities, emphasizing that "[t]he definition of family is
the foundation of the State's broader authority to regulate the subject
of domestic relations with respect to the '[p]rotection of offspring,
property interests, and the enforcement of marital responsibilities.' "195
Doug NeJaime thus characterized Windsor as emphasizing legal
"marriage's distributive function; marriage serve[s] as a gateway to
rights and benefits that provide stability and support" through limited
tangible goods and the conferral of an easily understood label of
commitment.196 This distributive function cannot be achieved through
negative liberty alone, as "public recognition contributes to the
preservation of the private support function of marriage."197 Several
192. 132 S. Ct. at 2032. The Court also stressed that "[w]e have recognized that 'where state
intestacy law provides that a child may take personal property from a father's estate, it may
reasonably be thought that the child will more likely be dependent during the parent's life and at
his death.' " Id. (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 514 (1976)).
193. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013).
194. Id. at 2695.
195. Id. at 2691 (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942)).
196. NeJaime, supra note 77, at 228.
197. Id. at 241.
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lower federal courts have similarly emphasized legal marriage's
support function post- Windsor.198
Both Capato and Windsor therefore make visible the role of the
legal family in incentivizing private support and care. Once in view, the
value of private family support appears to lurk behind many other
decisions as well. In particular, both Egelhoff and Hillman suggest hat
the legal status of marriage should entail lifelong support unless a
spouse takes affirmative steps to end both the legal relationship and all
provisions for support made during the relationship. In other words,
divorce is not enough to sever the support function; federal support
obligations remain unless expressly revoked. Although such a
conception of marriage may thwart both individual intent and state
sovereignty, it furthers the neoliberal interest in privatizing the
dependencies of family members. 199
The value of private family support thereby sits at the top of the
hierarchy of values underlying legal recognition of family. The private
support function does not extinguish the other values comprising this
hierarchy, however. Those values instead remain vitally important so
long as they do not disturb the private support function. Accordingly,
as set forth in Capato, federal courts value the pluralism that flows from
state sovereignty so long as that pluralism does not displace the support
function. Federal courts also value the equality and dignity of
individual family members, particularly if such dignity and equality
bolsters private family support, as Windsor and developments after
Windsor reveal. In fact, support and dignity may often be intertwined,
with dignity flowing from the formal decision to care for others. Yet if
principles of equality and dignity potentially thwart the legal family's
private support function, federal courts may embrace unequal
approaches to legal family recognition like those at issue in Capato.
Federal visions of family dependency and support thereby trump
untethered appeals to equality, individual intent, or states' authority to
define family.
198. See cases cited supra note 184.
199. Cf Nancy Polikoff, A Supreme Court Ruling That's About Way More Than Preemption,
70 NAT'L LAW. GUILD REV. 188, 190 (2013) ("But maybe effectuating the employee's intent isn't the
right purpose of a benefit that's payable upon an employee's death. If there's someone who





The contours of the legal family may remain in flux for quite
some time, as states, federal agencies, and federal courts continue to
respond to new reproductive technologies and evolving social norms. In
the process, new understandings of both family and federalism may
emerge. Up until now, however, federalism has not dictated family
status. Instead, as this Article has argued, understandings of family
formation and exit have become increasingly federalized.
These understandings of family serve multiple goals, but they
are rooted in the underlying rationale for legal recognition of family in
the neoliberal state: encouraging the private support of dependency.
Other relationships between family and the state are possible and likely
desirable. Indeed, a more attentive, supportive state might help
children and families flourish. The goal of private family support
crowds out these possibilities, however. This Article has analyzed this
dynamic as a descriptive matter, highlighting the ways that private
family support intersects with, and is often obscured by, appeals to
equality, dignity, and the pluralism that is thought to flow from
federalism. Excavating the privatization of dependency in this fashion
is a necessary first step for more robust examinations of the current
regime of family recognition, whether state or federal. In turn, such
examinations may ultimately inspire the development of viable
alternative forms of state support for families.
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